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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA A.
BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; G.
W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D.
BANKS, and all unknown persons who
claim any interest in the subject matter of this action,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No,
13868

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued to quiet title to a parcel of property
located in Park City, Utah, claiming ownership and adverse possession. The defendants Butkovich answered
claiming title and possession superior to plaintiff's to all
but a small part of the property claimed by plaintiff.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After -trial the lower count entered a decree quieting
title to the property in plaintiff based on a finding that
an affidavit gave plaintiff color of title. The lower court
denied a motion to amend the findings of fact and conelusions of law and to alter the judgment filed by defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the decree quieting title in
plaintiff reversed and! to have a decree entered quieting
title in defendants covering the property claimed by defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants Butkovioh obtained their title to the
property by two quit-claim deeds from Summit County
on July 9, 1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit County had
previously, in 1915 and 1940, obtained title by Auditor's
Tax Deeds resulting from tax sales in 1910 and 1935. The
second deed from the Courity was given to correct a slight
error in the description on the first deed (R. 62).
The Butkoviches thereafter requested Security Title
Company to issue title insurance to them on this property. Security Title Company first had Butkoviches convey the property to Security Title Company, using a
metes and bounds description, and Security Title Company reconveyed the property to Butkoviches using the
same description.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The plaintiff claims his title through a deed to him
from Robert T. Banks dated November 12, 1968. There
is no conveyance of any kind to Robert T. Banks. However, Banks signed an affidavit asserting that he was
trustee of the Assets Corporation which "became the
majority owner" of the assets of Park City Townsite
Company.
The history of the property involved in this action
is contained in the abstract of title introduced in evidence
as Exhibit No. 11. Since the entries in this abstract ame
not in chronological order, summaries of the chain of title
were prepared and introduced into evidence as Exhibits
11A and 11B. Because of the numerous defects in the
title claimed by Colman, these exhibits are set forth in
full. In explanation of the exhibits, the legal description
used in each conveyance is underlined and appears just
ahead of the conveyances using that description and the
numbers in parentheses indicate the page in the abstract
where each conveyance is found.
EXHIBIT NO. 11A
According to Abstract of Title No. B-26963
Prepared by Western States Title
Insurance Company
NW y4 SE % § 16, T2S, R4E, SLB & M
United States of America
i
(1) Frederick A. Nims
(3) Edward P. Ferry

Patent 2/26/77
Quit Claim Deed 1/13/80

j Those Parts of the NW % SE V4 § 16, T2S, R4E,
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not subdivided into lots and blocks and lying
Southwest of Norfolk Avenue in Park City.
(6)

David C. McLaughlin

Warranty Deed 2/8/83

NW y4 of SE y4 § 16, T2S, R4E, SLM; also all
of the unplatted land lying and being in the
above mentioned legal subdivisions of land.
(44)

Oliver C. Lockhart, Trustee Decree 8/19/14
Beneficiaries:
Edward P. Ferry 2/5
Amanda H. F. Hall 1/5 of 2/5
Hannah E. Jones 1/5 of 2/5
Heirs of Mary L. F. Eaistman 1/5 of 2/5
Edward P. Ferry 1/5 of 2/5
Frederick A. Nims )
and David D. Erwin J * ' 5
No conveyance horn Oliver C. Lockhart
An undivided one-half of all the right, title, and
interest of said Edward P. Ferry, of, in and to
the Park City Townsite, situated in Summit,
State of Utah.
William Montague Ferry, guardian of person
and estate of Edward P. Ferry, a mentally incompetent person.
(10)

The Michigan Trust Company
Deed 12/26/13
All its right, title and interest in and for the Park
City Townsite, situated in Summit County, State
of Utah.

(19) The Assets Corporation

Deed 12/28/16

No conveyance from the Assets Corporation
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All the unplatted land and the unoccupied and
unused land lying and being in the NE xk of the
NE V4 of Section 21, and the NW % of the SE
% and the E V2 of SE % of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
(23)

McCormick & Co., Bankers
Decree of Foreclosure
3/20/16 Rec. 9/16/49
v.

W. I. Snyder, as Trustee
(12)

No buyer named (No sale stated)
Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale 5/23/16

(14)

Park City Townsite Company
Assignment of Certificate
of Sale 11/21/16

NW y4 of SE y2 of § 16, T2S, R4E, SLM
(16)

Park City Townsite Company
Sheriff's Deed 11/21/16

No conveyance from P&rk City Townsite Company
t
The remaining assets of said Assets Corporation
(38) Robert T. Banks

By own affidavit 11/12/68

"Assets Corporation became the majority owner
of all the property and assets of said Park City
Townsite Company except a small holding of
W. J. Snyder/'
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All that part of the NW Y4 of the SE % of §
16, T2S, R4E, SLM that lies Westerly of Norfolk Avenue.
Robert T. Banks, as Trustee and individually
(36)

William J. Colman Warranty Deed 11/12/68

EXHIBIT NO. 11B
Chain of Title
According to Abstract of Title No. B-26963
Prepared by Western States
Title Insurance Company
Lots 21 to 32, inclusive, Block 29, Park City, also
16 Lots in rear of Block 29.
D. C. McLaughlin Estate
(43)

Summit County

(47)

Tax Sale 12/19/10
Auditors Tax Deed 6/11/15

All of unplatted land in Block 29, and
all land West of Block 29, and part
of Lot 1; part of Lot "A"; Park City
(49) Summit County Treasurer
1
(P&rk City Townsite Co.)
Summit County
Tax Sale 12/21/35
Marginal Auditors
Tax Deed 5/25/40
(50) A. J. Butkovich and Geneva A.
Butkovich
Quit Claim Deed 7/9/64
(58)

Correction Deed

Quit Claim Deed 4/15/65

J Lots 21 to 32 inclusive, Block 29, and 16 Lots in
i the rear of Block 29, all unplatted land in Block
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I 29, and all land West of Block 29 and lots 1 and
A, Park City Survey. Metes and Bounds description described to-wit:
BEGINNING at a point which is the S.W. corner of the N.W. lA of the S.E. xk of Section 16,
T2S, R4E, SLB & M., and running thence Easterly along % lA Section line a distance of 1200.0
feet, more or less to a point on the West Line of
Lot 2, Block 29, Park City Survey and running
thence N. 23°38' W. 410 feat; thence S. 66°57' W.
75 feet; thence, N. 23°38' W. 455 feet to a point
on the North line of Block 28, Park City Survey; thence No. 66° 57' E. 75 feet; thence N.
23°38/ W. 79.3 feet to a point on the N.W. corner of Lot 2, Block 27, Park City Survey; thence
S. 66°57' W. 75 feet; thence No. 23°38' W. 50
feet; thence N. 66°57' E. 75 feet to a point on
the N.W. corner of Lot 4, Block 27, Park City
Survey; thence 23°38' W. 225 feet to a point on
the N.W. corner of Lot 13, Block 27, Ptok City
Survey; thence S. 66°57' W. 75 feet; thence N.
23°38' W. 55 feet; thence S. 66°57' W. 75 feet,
thence N. 23°38' W. 50 feet, to a point on the
North property line of First Street (line extended) thence along said North line (extended)
N. 66°57' E. 75 feet to a point on the S.W. corner
of Lot 9, Block 26, Park City Survey; thence N.
23°38' W. 144.8 feet to a point on the % Section
line of said Section 16; thence West along said %
line 490.0 feet to the center of said Section 16;
thence S. along the lA line a distance of 1320.0
feet more or less to the point of beginning.
T
(31)
k

Security Title Company
Warranty Deed 2/23/66
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(33) A. J. Butkovich and
Geneva A. Butkovich
Quit Claim Deed 2/23/66
It should be pointed out that the order in which conveyance (19) appears above has been changed from that
on Exhibit No. 11A to further clarify the chain of title.
Contrary to the assertions of Banks in his affidavit
(page 38 of Exhibit No. 11) that the corporation was
winding up and that he was named as trustee to dispose
of the assets, no assets of the Assets Corporation were
transferred to Banks and the corporation was not winding-up. Instead, the minutes of the directors' meeting on
the date referred to in the affidavit (Exhibit No. 13)
show that the secretary was instructed to reinstate the
company in good standing, the president was authorized
to negotiate a loan from the bank. Further^ the corporation continued to exist, was conveying property, redeeming taxes, selling patented mining claims, all as a corporation, and depositing the proceeds of sales in a corporate
bank account, in 1940, 1944 and 1961 (Exhibits No. 14
& No. 15).
Moreover, Banks wrote a letter on September 20,
1968, giving instructiions on how to establish title to
this property which he knew he didn't have. This letter
was introduced as Exhibit No. 16 and is set forth in full
under Pbint I of the Argument section of this brief.
Alter Butkovich received his deed to the property
in 1964, he took a bulldozer on the property and blocked
off entrances, drove in stakes and tied ribbons on trees
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to mark the boundaries and put up "no trespassing" signs.
He also cleared brush off the ground and leased the property to United Park City Mines Company for use as a
ski run (R. 62-63, Exh. 20).
After Coiman received his deed in 1968 he also claims
to have posted "no trespassing" signs on the property
and to have chased off Christmas tree cutters (R. 10).
Beyond that he has taken no action with respect to the
property that would show any ownership (R. 15). At
the trial his attorneys admitted that he did not have
possession of the property "within the meaning of the
statute" (R. 74).
Upon learning of the claim of Butkovich to this property, Coiman filed this action on June 24, 1971, praying
for a decree quieting title in him based on ownership
and adverse possession.
ARGUMENT
In this case the plaintiff, Coiman, claims to be the
owner of the fee title to the property in dispute. His
claim of adverse possession was abandoned at trial because he didn't have possession (R. 74) and had not paid
taxes for the required seven years. The defendants
Butkovich are the owners of a tax title obtained by quitclaim deed from Summit County, which obtained title
by Auditor's Tax Deed years earlier. While the validity
of tax titles are often challenged, the validity of defendants' tax title is not relevant here because the plaintiff
has the burden to establish his title first before he has
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standing to challenge defendants' tax title. There are
two fundamental points which require the reversal of
the decree quieting title in plaintiff and the dismissal of
plaintiff's case. These points will be considered first and
then the arguments establishing defendants' right to have
the property in dispute quieted in them will follow.
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AND THEREFORE NO STANDING
TO CHALLENGE DEFENDANTS' TITLE.
A fundamental point of Utah law in cases of this
kind is that plaintiff can prevail only on the strength
of his own title and not because of any weakness in the
title of defendants. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment
Company, 29 U. 2d 421, 511 P. 2d 145 (1973); Music
Service Corporation v. Walton, 20 U. 2d 16, 432 P. 2d 334
(1967); Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. 2d
862 (1939). As to the quality of title which plaintiff
must establish, this Court stated in the Music Service
case, supra, at page 336, quoting from the earlier case of
Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 Pac. 696 (1907):
" . . . Of course, where one proves a perfect chain
of paper title from its original source, no proof
of actual possession at all is required. In such
event the presumption would be all sufficient and
the title would be a complete and perfect title.
But when this is not done, a title prima facie is
shown by a grant from some one who held posses-
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sion, or by such grant and possession under it
by the grantee . . ."
These same requirements are set forth in the Babcock
case, supra.
In the instant case the plaintiff introduced only the
deed from Banks to himself. He has no chain of title from
the patentee, he has admitted that he did not have possession of the property, and he did not attempt to prove
possession by has grantee, Banks, as required by the
above cases. Therefore, he has shown no title in himself
and his complaint should have been dismissed.
The chain of title, or lack of it, is shown on Exhibit
No. 11A set forth in the Statement of Facts above. There
are numerous defects in this chain, all of which should
be obvious from reading Exhibit No. 11A, but are summarized here:
1.

No conveyance fnom Oliver C. Lockhart
(44).

2.

The conveyance from William Montague
Ferry, as guardian of Edward P. Ferry (10),
at most, could convey a one-fifth beneficial
interest in the "Park City Townsite," which
is not the description by which his trustee
took title.

3.

The Assets Corporation, at most, received a
one-fifth interest in the "Park City Townsite," whatever that is (19).

4.

No conveyance from the Assets Corporation.

5.

The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale (12) is in-
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adequate since it does not indicate that the
property was sold nor does it name a buyer.
6.

The Sheriff's Deed (16) uses a different
property description than that in the Decree
of Foreclosure (23).

7.

No conveyance from the Park City Townsite Company.

8.

Affidavit of Robert T. Banks (38) is not
competent to establish title since it is hearsay, self-serving and not the best evidence.

9.

The description of the property in Banks'
affidavit (38) is inadequate and shows on
its face that the Assets Corporation was, at
most, only a part owner of some unidentified
asserts.

10.

There is no conveyance to Banks.

All of these defects in the title of plaintiff were admitted by plaintiff's own expert witness (R. 40-53). The
plaintiff, however, overlooks all of these defects and relies
solely on the affidavit of Banks to establish his title. The
affidavit is, of course, hearsay and was properly objected
to as such. It is thus inadmissible to establish any of
the facts which it asserts. The fact that it was recorded
does not make it admissible. That no effect is to be given
to such self-serving recitals in recorded documents is
established by State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17
U. 2d 412, 413 P. 2d (303 (1966). The facts in that case
were almost identical to those now before the Court.
There, the claimant of the fee title received a quit-claim
deed from Harriet AUenbach. The deed contained a re-
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cital that she was the widow of Jacob I. Allenbach, who
was the record title holder at that time. This Court
stated:
"A recital in a deed which would indicate
that the grantor is an heir or otherwise might
deraign title from a record owner is merely a
self-serving dedaration. . . . "The recital is» of
course, no evidence in favor of anyone daiming
under the grantor. It is no more competent as
evidence, as against a stranger to the deed, of
the facts stated, than it would be if embodied in
a letter or any other paper'.9' (Quoting 6 Thompson on Real Property, § 3110 (1962 Replacement) (Emphasis added.))
In the Thompson case both parties had been paying taxes
on the property although neither had been in actual possession. The claimant of the legal title had challenged the
tax title of the other party and the tax title was proved
to be defective. However, the Court held that since the
party claiming the legal title had failed to prove its title
(the hearsay recital in the deed being ineffective), it
had no standing to challenge the tax title even though
that tax title was defective. It would appear impossible
to find a case more dispositive of the issues now before
this Court. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of every doubt
and accepting Banks' affidavit at face value, plaintiff
has not proved his title and has no standing to challenge
the title of defendants.
However, the plaintiff's difficulties with Banks' affidavit are only beginning. The most serious difficulty is
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that the assertions in the affidavit are false and it appears
that he attempted to establish title in himself by fraud.
Banks was faced with two hurdles to get the property
into his own name. In the admitted absence of any conveyances, he had to get title from Park City Townsite
Company to Assets Corporation, of which he said he was
a director and officer, and then to himself. The affidavit
attempts to assert that since 1916 the Assets Corporation was the "majority owner of all the property and
assets of Park City Townsite Company/' and that in
1920 the President of Assets Corporation, by a resolution
of Assets Corporation, "was directed to take over the
affairs of Park City Townsite Company."
Such phraseology is hardly the epitome of legal precision. But it is clear in reading the affidavit in a manner
most favorable to Banks and to plaintiff that the Assets
Corporation was not the sole owner of the property and
assets of Park City Townsite Company, and no attempt
at all is made to show how plaintiff has succeeded to the
other ownership interests. Moreover, it is difficult to
understand how the resolution of one corporation to
"take over the affairs" of another has any effect in accomplishing this.
Even ignoring these rather massive problems, the
affidavit also asserts
"That on or about the 19th day of October, 1936,
at a regular meeting of the directors of said Assets
Corporation, on motion duly made and passed
the remaining assets of said Assets Corporation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were transferred, assigned and delivered to me
for the purpose of paying all obligations of said
corporation and disposing of any remaining
assets of the corporation and dispursing any and
all moneys received from sale or disposal of said
assets to the remaining stockholders of said corporation."
The problem is that the minutes of that directors'
meeiting on October 19, 1936, which have been admitted
in evidence as Exhibit 13, show that Banks' recital of
what happened is totally false! Rather than show that
the remaining assets of Assets Corporation were transferred to Banks for purposes of paying all obligations,,
disposing of any remaining assets and "dispursing (sic)"
all moneys received from sale of assets to the remaining
stockholders, as Banks alleges, the minutes show that the
secretary was instructed to reinstate the company in
good standing by payment of delinquent franchise taxes,
and to redeem certain mining claims from delinquent
taxes. The president, Mr. Ferry, was authorized to negotiate a loan from the First National Bank of Salt Lake
City. These are hardly the acts of a company undergoing dissolution. The only reference in those minutes
vaguely reminiscent of the Bank's affidavit is authorization to Mr. Ferry (not Mr. Bank) to "take over the
affairs of the company with a view to disposing of its
property." It is not clear from the minutes what company
is meant by "that company," but even if it were intended
to be the Park City Townsite Company, such authority
was clearly not given to Banks.
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Far from being a corporation which in 1936 had
authorized Banks to wind up its affairs, the corporation
in 1940 and 1944 was conveying property, without any
reference to Banks, and was redeeming claims from delinquent taxes as shown by the minutes in Exhibit 14.
Exhibit 15 is the minutes of a board meeting of the
Asserts Corporation in 1961, which Banks signed as Secretary. These minutes authorize the sale of certain patented claims, and report the sale of other claims, the
proceeds from which were deposited in the corporate bank
account. Obviously, Banks was far from acting as a trustee to liquidate the corporation.
Par more serious is a letter from Banks himself written shortly prior to the date of his deed to plaintiff, which
has been admitted in evidence as Exhibit 16 and which
shows most clearly that Banks himself knew his claim
to title was improper.
The letter in its entirety is as follows:
"Yours of 9-16 and 9-17 with Earnest Money
Agreement arrived yesterday. The price is O.K.
and I am enclosing 2 signed copies of the E.M.A.
"Now — how to get title to this acreage. I
have gotten the papers from the auditor who is
still ill, and given them to my son Bill — and
he will go thru them in the next few days — and
dig out and give me anything that has any reference to Park City Townsite — and I'll send
them to you.
"When I received all the data on the Assets
Corp. from the lawyer in Idaho Falls, who had
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received them from your office afiter Geo. Critchlow died they included stock book — seal —
minute book and ledger of the Assets Corp. — but
nothing of this nature of the Park City Townsite
Co. What happened to these I don't know, only
George knew the story. The only thing I know
of the Townsite Co. are in the minutes of the
Assets Corp. and contained in the pages I cut
out of the Minutes Book and mailed to you —
and from the old ledger which I quoted to you
in full specifying that the Assets Corp. took over
the Townsite Co. at an assumed value of $2300
— That was Dec. 20 -1916. This valuation was
later raised to $25,000 in August 10th 1922 —
and that's it unless Bill can dig up something.
George Critchlow must have had the stock book
at one time because in the minutes, which I sent
you, they issued 10 shares each of Townsite stock
to Bill Ferry and F. Tom Boise — I suppose to
qualify as directors — or some such purpose "I've thought this over and I think we would
get into a hell of a mess trying to prove Park
City Townsite Co (given or sold) to Assets Corp.
(no longer an entity) and the Assets Corp. had
sold everything left to me for $1.00.
"Instead lets say I am the Park City Townsite (anything which is left) which is true. In
order to do this — lets have, say 100 printed
letterheads and envelopes, using your Salt Lake
address and printing my name Robert T. Banks
Trustee."
"Then you write a letter to Blanch R. Young
Treas. Summit Co. and state that the properties
listed under Park City Townsite Co. W. A. Snyder Trustee should be changed to Robert T.
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Banks Trustee inasmuch as W. A. Snyder has
been dead for several years. I will sign this letter.
"Then say we have received the Valuation
notices of these properties and wish to pay the
taxes when tax notices are mailed out in Oct this
year — and the notices should be mailed to 414
Walker Bank Bldg.
"If this is O.K. I will then open a checking
account at Walker Bank under the name of Park
City Townsite Co., Robert T. Banks Trustee —
I used to have 2 accounts at the Bank where I
was well known — under the name Robert T.
Banks — and Robert T. Banks Mgr. — and borrowed money from them from time to time —
Then I will pay the taxes from this Townsite
Acct.
"This will in no way involve you as I am
only using your office and you are acting as my
aitty.
"If you think it best you could go up to
Coalville in advance and set things up with the
Co. Treasurer,, before sending the letter. Let me
know what you think of this idea — If O.K. then
I could deed the properties to Coleman under
my signature as Trustee.
"I don't want to do anything dishonest and
if later I get in trouble I can show from records
the Park City Townsite belonged to Assets Corp.
— and I bought everything that was left of the
Assets Corp. when the Corp. was dissolved.
"But in my opinion it would take a lot of
time and expense to go that way rather than the
way I suggest.
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"I don't think it advisable for you to come
up here until we see what Bill digs up.
"I am enclosing 50.00 for a trip to Coalville
and the stationery — if more say so.
"I think the price you got is a good one
and shows the ski activity in and around Paiik
City.
"Let me hear from you."
In suimmary, Banks says, "Now — how to get title
to this acreage . . . I've thought this over and I think
we would get into a hell of a mess trying to prove Park
City Townsiite Co. (given or sold) to Assets Corp. (no
longer an entity) and the Assets Corp. had sold everything left to me for $1.00. Instead let's say I am the Park
City Townsite . . ."
But for some reason Banks changed his mind and
less than two months later asserted by affidavit as a
fact an allegation which he acknowledged would get him
"into a hell of a mess" — that Park City Townsite Company gave or sold to Assets Corporation, which in turn
transferred to him.
Surely a false, self-serving, hearsay affidavit cannot
establish title, nor even color of title, in plaintiff. This
Court has held that not even a contract of purchase is
a written instrument upon which color of title can be
based. Memmott v. Bosh,
U. 2d
, 520 P. 2d 1342
(1974). Plaintiff has no title and, therefore, no standing
to challenge defendants' title. His relief is in a claim
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for fraud or on the warranties in his deed against Banks
for return of his purchase price.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
The statutes of limitations as they apply to this case
read as follows:
Section 78-12-5.1
. . . with respect to actions . . . brought . . .
for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title
or determine the ownership of real property
against the holder of a tax title to such property,
no such action . . . shall be commenced . . . more
than four years sifter the date of the tax deed,
conveyance or transfer creating such tax title
unless the person commencing . . . such action
. . . or his predecessor has actually occupied or
been in possession of such property within four
years prior to the commencement . . . of such
action . . .
Section 78-12-6.2
No action . . . for the recovery or possession
of real property or to quiet title or determine the
ownership thereof shall be commenced . . .
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale,
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any
county, or directly to any other purchase (r)
thereof at any public or private tax sale . . . provided, however, that this section shall not bar
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any action . . . by the owner of the legal title to
such property where he or his predecessor has
actually occupied or been in actual possession of
such property within four years from the commencement . . . of such action . . .
It is established by the evidence that the Defendants
Butkovich are the holders of a tax title obtained from
Summit County in July, 1964. The tax title itself was
created much earlier when the property was conveyed
to Summit County in 1915 and 1940. This action was
commenced in June of 1971, more than four years from
the date of the creation of the tax title. Therefore, under
provisions of the above statutes, no action can be brought
unless the Plaintiff Colman has "actually occupied or
been in actual possession" of the property involved. Thus,
the only important question is whether or not the Plaintiff Colman has satisfied this requirement of actual occupation or possession.
Mr. Colman stated at the trial that he had not lived
on the property, nor constructed anything on it, nor put
up a fence, nor planted anything, nor cultivated it, nor
plowed it, nor occupied it. His only acts with respect
to the property, according to his own testimony, were
to inspect it, to show it to others, to chase away Christmas tree cutters and to place some temporary "no trespass" signs on the property. His attorneys conceded at
the trial that he did not have possession of the property
at any time as required by the statutes.
The only cases which have construed the foregoing
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statutes have not discussed what constitutes actual occupation or possession, but in each case the party challenging the tax title had not occupied nor possessed the
propeorty. Under the cases which consider constructive
possession of property, the acts of Colman with respect
to this property would not even constitute constructive
possession. This is so because the purpose of the statute
requiring possession is to "bring it home" to the world
and to any party interested in the property that the party
in possession is making a claim to that property. The
case of Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P. 2d 216 (1947),
was decided under a claim of adverse possession, as the
Plaintiff was claiming here but abandoned that claim at
trial,, although not construing the statutes quoted above
since those statutes were not passed until later. That
case held that leveling the property, dumping loads of
dirt thereon, clearing weeds, storing junk on the property,
allowing the use of the property for a carnival and placing a commercial sign on the property was not sufficient
to constitute adverse possession. Referring to other cases
where the adverse possession was held sufficient, the
Court in Day v. Steele said, "the changes were such that
they would apprise anyone that the land was being used
in the manner in which the owner would so use it. The
changes were substantial and of a permanent nature such
as remained visible for the duration of the statutory
period and not temporary acts or such as could be mistaken for mere occasional trespasses." The acts of ownership in Day v. Steele were certainly more substantial and
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more permanent than those of Colman with respect to
the property involved here, and yet those acts wecre held
insufficient.
It should be obvious from the above quoted statutes
and related statutes, however, that more, in the way of
possession, is required under Sections 78-12-5.1 and 7812-5.2 than under other statutes. These sections require
actual occupation and actual possession, which can only
mean actually residing or conducting a business on the
property so as to make it obvious to anyone at any point
in time that the property is owned by someone. This
requirement of actual occupation is in contrast to the
requirements of other possession or adverse possession
statutes. For example, the first sentence of Section 7812-5.1, which applies only when no tax title is involved,
only requires the party to be "seized or possessed" of the
property. The first sentence of Section 78-12-7.1, which
also applies only when no tax title is involved, requires
the property to be "held or possessed adversely." The
first sentence of Section 78-12-12.1, which applies to a
party daimdng adverse possession, requires the land to
be "occupied and claimed". In none of these statutes
is the word "actual" used in connection with occupation
or possession and obviously the legislature had a greater
requirement in mind When it used the word "actual" in
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2. The ordinary and usual
meaning of that word requires residence or conducting
of a business upon the property claimed. This has not
been done according to the admission of the plaintiff,
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and therefore the plain/tiff's Complaint should have been
dismissed.
Fiirthermore, Colman did not receive his deed to the
property until November of 1968. This was more than
four years after Butkoviches received their tax title in
July 1964 and, of course, many years after the county
received its deeds in 1915 and 1940. Colman makes no
claim of ownership or possession prior to the date of his
deed and, of course, would have no right to do so. Under
the case of Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.
2d 814 (1957), affd on rehearing, 8 U. 2d 348, 334 P. 2d
759 (1959), plaintiff has no right to make any claim for
this property after four years have expired. The Court
there stated at page 816:
If read literally and not in context with the entire statute, some of the wording might make it
appear that one holding a tax title, say, for twenty-five years, who commences an action thereon,
could be defeated if a defendant having a record
interest in the property could show that he had
possession of the property, even for a brief time,
within the four yeans next prior to the commencement of the action. We believe the legislature
had in mind a four-year statute of limitations
barring claims against tax titles, which four-year
period dated from the initiation of the tax title,
during which period any claimant against the tax
title must have had possession of the property
to protect any claim he might have. Any other
interpretation does not square with the general
nature and purpose of the act, and could lead to
novel and, we believe, unintended results, so as
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to defeat the entire purpose of a statute that
seems to be designed to settle, not confuse, and
to make certain, not uncertain, titles based on
statutory liquidation of tax charges.
In Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 354 P. 2d 1066
(1960), summary judgment was held "inescapably" proper
where no possession was shown within four years of the
issuance of the tax deed by the party attacking the tax
title. There is no dispute of these facts here. Colman
did not have any kind of possession, let alone actual possession, within four years from the date of the tax deeds
to the county in 1915 and 1940 nor within four years
from the date of the deed to Butkoviches in July, 1964,
nor at any time for that matter. Dismissal of Colman's
complaint and judgment for Butkoviches should be "inescapable".
POINT III.
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE
QUIETED IN DEFENDANTS BUTKOVICH.
The adverse possession statutes as applicable to the
claim of Defendants Butkovich is as follows:
Section 78-12-7.1
. . . if in any action any party shall establish
prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any
real property under a tax title held by him and
his predecessors for four years prior to the commencement of such action and one year after the
effective date of this amendment he shall be
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presumed to be the owner of such property by
adverse possession unless it appears that the
owner of the legal title or his predecssor has actually occupied or been in possession of such
property under such title or that such tax title
owner and his predecessor have failed to pay all
the taxes levied or assessed upon such property
within such four-year period.
The evidence shows that defendants Butkovich are
holders of a tax title and have paid the taxes for all years
since acquiring the tax title. Therefore, Section 78-12-7.1
presumes the defendants Butkovich to be the owners of
the property by adverse possession. Unless actual occupation by Colman is shown, the title to the property is
presumed to be in Butkoviches. As shown under Point
II above, the admissions of Colman established that he
did not have actual possession of the property and there
is no evidence available to overcome the presumption of
title in Butkoviches. There being no dispute of these
fa<3te, defendants are therefore entitled to judgment quieting title in them.
The position of plaintiff at the trial has been to ignore his own lack of title and only attempt to show some
weakness in defendants' tax title. Plaintiff overlooks the
point that the validity of defendants' tax title is irrelevant. Section 78-12-5,3, Utah Code Annotated, states:
The term "tax title" as used in Section 7812-5.2 and Section 59-10-65, and the related
amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12,
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means any title to real property, whether valid
or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer
of such property in the course of a statutory
proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied
against such property whereby the property is
relieved from a tax lien.
The purpose of the legislature in passing these sections of the Code was to lay to rest any questions as to
the validity of tax titles after four years. Defendants'
tax title has been held for more than the required four
years and, therefore, its validity cannot be challenged.
Layton v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 138, 449 P. 2d 986 (1969).
Fxirtheormore, the claimed problem of identifying the
land deeded to Butkovich from Summit County, was resolved by plaintiff's own expert witness who testified that
he could locate that description with the refearence in the
deed to Park City (R. 33-34). It was established that
the initials "P.C." on the deed is a standard, well-known
and commonly accepted designation for property in the
Park City Townsite (R. 90-91). There is no question
about the location of this property. Both the witnesses
for plaintiff and defendants testified that they could locate the property on defendants' tax deed.
Since the location of the property described on the
deeds to defendants was not in doubt, the plaintiff's attempt to show a weakness in defendants' title failed.
Again, the validity of defendants' tax title is not relevant
since plaintiff failed to show actual possession of the
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property by him. Title to the property should, therefore,
have been quieted in defendants.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE OBJECTION TO THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY LOCATING THE PROPERTY
DESCRIBED ON EXHIBITS 1 AND 2.
The witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant established that the property described on the deeds to
defendants could be located on the ground and therefore
the location was not in dispute. However, when the defendants' expert witness was asked his opinion as to the
location of this property, the court sustained the plaintiff's objection on the assumption that "extraneous evidence as to where the property is located" is not admissible (R. 91-94).
The authority relied upon by the court in refusing
to admit this evidence was Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah
442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938). Far from being authority for
plaintiff's position, that case held the description of the
property involved to be sufficient and not misleading and
relied upon testimony of numerous witnesses that the
alleged faults in the description were common parlance
and that there was no other land in the County to which
the description would apply. Furthermore, this Court
has recently stated that parol evidence is admissible to
apply, though not to supply, a description of lands in a
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contract and that it "may be used for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing with its
location on the ground." Davison v. Robbins, 30 U. 2d
338, 517 P. 2d 1026 (1973).
Defendants made a proffer of proof as to the location
of this property (R. 94-98) wherein the witness stated
that the boundaries of this property were well defined
because of well defined boundaries to the West and North
and no assessment had been made of the surrounding
property still owned by the United States. The testimony
was for the purpose of identifying the description in the
deed with its location on the ground. There was no other
property in the county to which this description would
apply. Therefore, this evidence should have been received
on the authority of the Ferguson and Davison cases,
supra.
CONCLUSION
Because the plaintiff has no title himself he has no
standing to challenge the title of defendants. Even if he
did have some claim of title, his action against defendants
is barred by the statutes of limitaitions The statutes
presume the title to be in the defendants since no actual
possession has been claimed or proved by plaintiff. The
question of vagueness or ambiguity in the deeds to defendants should never have been reached by the court
because plaintiff had no title and no standing to challenge
defendants' title and because of the bar of the statutes of
limitations. Yet» the alleged vagueness or ambiguity was
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removed by testimony from witnesses for both plaintiff
and defendants and by the proffer of proof which should
have been received. Therefore, the decree quieting title
in plaintiff should be reversed and title to the proprty
in dispute should be quieted in defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorney for Appellant
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